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QUESTION PRESENTED
Do the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments permit
a state to abolish the insanity defense?
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INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE 1
Amici curiae are a group of philosophically and
politically diverse law school professors and scholars
in the fields of criminal law and mental health from a
variety of disciplines who have been teaching and
writing about the insanity defense and related issues
throughout their careers. They include the authors of
leading criminal law and mental health law treatises
and casebooks and numerous important scholarly
books and articles.
Amici believe this case raises important questions
about principles of criminal responsibility, the integral
role of the insanity defense in Anglo-American law,
and the inadequacy of the “mens rea alternative” to the
traditional affirmative defense. Their teaching and
research on the subject have given them a unique
appreciation of the historical and doctrinal significance of the defense of legal insanity.
A complete list of amici who reviewed and join in
this brief is included in the attached Appendix.
Amici file this brief solely as individuals and not on
behalf of any institution with which they are affiliated.
Affiliations are provided solely for the purpose of
identification.

1

No counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part,
and no party or counsel for a party made a monetary contribution
intended to fund its preparation or submission. No person other
than amici made a monetary contribution to the preparation or
submission of this brief. The parties were given timely notice and
have consented to this filing.

2
BACKGROUND
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The affirmative defense of legal insanity has such a
strong historical, legal, moral and practical pedigree
and is so widely accepted that providing such a defense
is a matter of fundamental fairness in a just society.
Jurisdictions have substantial leeway in deciding
what test best meets their legal and moral policies, but
some form of affirmative defense is a prerequisite
of justice and therefore is required under the Due
Process clause.
Legal insanity gives doctrinal expression to fundamental legal and moral principles that have been
recognized by the common law and statute for centuries and that this Court has repeatedly acknowledged.
Punishment under the penal law is not justified unless
an offender can fairly be held criminally responsible
for his conduct. There is no dispute that severe mental
disorder can strongly affect an individual’s cognitive
and self-regulation capacities and that in extreme
cases, the defects are sufficiently grave to negate any
attribution of fault because such offenders do not
know, understand or appreciate the wrongfulness of
their actions. Criminal blame and punishment are
fundamentally unfair because such offenders are not
responsible for their criminal conduct. Aside from four
states in our country, some form of the insanity
defense is universal in United States law, as well as in
every other jurisdiction in the common law world.
The alternative to the insanity defense at issue in
this case, which permits evidence of mental abnormality to be introduced to negate the mens rea for the
crime charged, is insufficient to achieve the goal of
responding justly to severely mentally disordered
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offenders. In most cases, mental disorder, including
severe mental disorder, does not negate mens rea.
Instead, the offender’s disordered cognition gives the
offender the reason to form the mens rea required by
the definition of the offense. Although an offender
may act for reasons entirely detached from reality
through no fault of his own, the offender will almost
always be exposed to conviction of the most serious
crime charged. These are profoundly unjust results.
Because Kansas has abolished the defense of
insanity, the defendant had no opportunity for a
factual determination regarding the severity of his
mental disorder and its impact on his ability to appreciate the wrongfulness of his behavior. Accordingly,
this Court should reverse the conviction and remand
the case to the Supreme Court of Kansas to take
appropriate action to reinstate the insanity defense.
ARGUMENT
I. THE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE OF LEGAL
INSANITY EXPRESSES FUNDAMENTAL
LEGAL PRINCIPLES LONG RECOGNIZED BY THE COMMON LAW, STATE
AND FEDERAL STATUTES AND THE
JURISPRUDENCE OF THIS COURT
This section provides the positive argument in favor
of providing an insanity defense. It then considers the
leeway of jurisdictions to establish a test for legal
insanity that comports with the justice goals of
individual jurisdictions.
A. The Legal and Moral Necessity of the
Insanity Defense
It is a fundamental principle of justice that if an
offender was not responsible for his crime, blame and

4
punishment under the penal law are fundamentally
unfair and thus a violation of Due Process. The
affirmative defense of legal insanity applies this
fundamental principle by excusing those mentally
disordered offenders whose disorder or intellectual
disability deprived them of rational understanding of
their conduct or, in a minority of states, by excusing
offenders whose capacity to control their conduct at
the time of the crime was profoundly and severely
impaired. Michael S. Moore, Law and Psychiatry
(Cambridge Univ. Press 1984); Herbert Fingarette
& Ann Hasse, Mental Disabilities and Criminal
Responsibility (Berkeley Univ. of California Press
1979); Stephen J. Morse, Mental Disorder and
Criminal Law, 101 J. Crim L. & Criminology 885, 925
(2011).
This principle is simple but profound. Indeed, in
recognition of this, the insanity defense has been a
feature of ancient law and of English law since the
14th Century. Thomas Maeder, Crime and Madness:
The Origins and Evolution of the Insanity Defense
(Harper & Row 1985); 1 Nigel Walker, Crime and
Insanity in England (Edinburgh Univ. Press 1968);
Brian E. Elkins, Idaho’s Repeal of the Insanity
Defense: What Are We Trying to Prove?, 31 Idaho L.
Rev. 151, 161 (1994). The predominant modern test
for legal insanity dates to the 19th Century with
M’Naghten’s Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843), but some
form of an affirmative defense of legal insanity existed
many centuries before that. A small number of
states tried to abolish the insanity defense in the
early part of the twentieth century, but their state
supreme courts found these attempts unconstitutional. Stephen M. LeBlanc, Comment, Cruelty to the
Mentally Ill: An Eighth Amendment Challenge to the
Abolition of the Insanity Defense, 56 Am. U. L. Rev.
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1281, 1289 n.45 (2007). Thus, the insanity defense
was universal in the United States from the founding
until the last decades of the 20th Century. Abraham
S. Goldstein, The Insanity Defense (Yale Univ. Press,
1967); Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735 (2006). Despite
the recent deviation from this longstanding principle
by four states, a strong consensus still supports
retention of the insanity defense, as was thoroughly
explained by the Supreme Court of Nevada in 2001,
when that court held that the legislature’s effort to
abolish the defense was a violation of due process
under both the state and federal constitutions. Finger
v. State, 27 P. 3d 66 (Nev. 2001). The insanity defense
is firmly rooted in the legal history and traditions of
the United States.
In both law and morals, the capacity for reason is
the primary foundation for responsibility and competence. The precise cognitive deficit a person must
exhibit can of course vary from context to context. In
addition, many believe that the capacity to regulate
one’s own behavior properly, to be able to control one’s
conduct, is also a foundation for responsibility. In the
criminal justice system, an offender who lacks the
capacity to understand the wrongness of his actions as
the result of severe mental disorder—a condition that
is not the offender’s fault—may not be convicted and
punished.
Under a parallel body of law in many jurisdictions,
a defendant who is profoundly unable to regulate his
behavior is regarded as undeserving of full blame and
punishment and must be excused in a sufficiently
extreme case. Moreover, it is generally acknowledged
that offenders in these two categories cannot be
deterred because the rules of law and morality cannot
adequately guide them. Failing to excuse severely
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impaired mentally disordered offenders is inconsistent
with both retributive and deterrent theories of just
punishment.
Legally insane offenders are not excused solely
because they suffered from a severe mental disorder at
the time of the crime. The mental disorder must also
impair their ability to know, understand or appreciate
that what they are doing is wrong or to impair some
other functional capacity that a jurisdiction believes
is crucial to responsibility. The crimes of those found
legally insane do not result from bad judgment,
insufficient moral sense, bad attitudes, or bad characters, none of which is an excusing condition. Rather,
the crimes of legally insane offenders arise from a lack
of understanding or lack of self-regulation capacity
that is produced by severe mental abnormality and
thus their criminal conduct is not reflective of culpable
moral failure. To convict such people offends the basic
sense of justice.
This Court has recently recognized that defects
in the capacity for rationality and self-regulation
preclude the most severe punishments for offenders
with intellectual disability and juvenile offenders.
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (intellectual
disability); Roper v. Simmons, 534 U.S. 551 (2005)
(juveniles). These defects exist along a continuum,
ranging from mild to severe. In the cases involving
intellectual disability and youth, the offenders were
responsible to some degree, but in cases of more severe
intellectual disability or developmental immaturity,
holding such offenders responsible at all offends
widely shared views about responsibility. The same
principles apply to people with mental disorder.
Although most people with mental disorder who
commit crimes may be fully or partially responsible,
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in cases of severe disorder, the rationality and selfregulation defects this Court has recognized are so
substantial that the offender is blameless and should
not be held responsible.2
A similar baseline principle explains the many
competence doctrines employed in the criminal justice
process. This Court has long recognized that at every
stage justice demands that some people with severe
mental abnormalities must be treated differently from
those without substantial mental impairment because
some impaired defendants are incapable of reason and
understanding in a specific context. Competence to
stand trial, Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 (1975);
competence to plead guilty and to waive counsel,
Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389 (1993); competence to
represent oneself, Indiana v. Edwards, 534 U.S. 164
(2008); and competence to be executed, Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986), Panetti v. Quarterman,
551 U.S. 930 (2007), Madison v. Alabama, 139 S. Ct.
718 (2019), are all examples in which the Constitution
requires such special treatment. It is unfair and
offensive to the dignity of criminal justice to treat
people without understanding as if their understanding was unimpaired. Evidence of mental disorder is
routinely introduced in all these contexts to determine
if the defendant must be accorded special treatment.
The impact of mental disorder on an offender’s
responsibility and competence is recognized throughout the criminal law. Even the few jurisdictions that
2

Note that the affirmative defense of legal insanity is the
traditional doctrine by which people with marked intellectual
disability can be fully excused. If the insanity defense were
eliminated, most such offenders will form the requisite mens rea
for the crime charged and will be punished despite lacking
responsibility.
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have abolished the insanity defense, such as Kansas,
recognize that mental disorder affects criminal responsibility because they permit the introduction of
evidence of mental disorder to negate the mens rea for
the crime charged and at sentencing. State v. Kahler,
410 P.3d 105, 124-25 (Kan. 2018). As Part II explains,
however, this use of mental disorder evidence does not
honor the principles concerning responsibility that are
so deeply rooted in our legal history and tradition. As
this Court has recognized, state infliction of stigmatization and punishment is a severe infringement, In
re Winship, 377 U.S. 358, 363-64 (1970). It is unfair to
prevent a defendant from proving, based on routinely
admissible evidence, that he lacked rational understanding of his conduct, even if he formed the charged
mens rea. That is precisely the issue Kahler raises.
Historical practice, the near universal acceptance of
the need for an independent affirmative defense of
legal insanity, and the fundamental unfairness of
blaming and punishing legally insane offenders provide the strongest reasons to conclude that fundamental fairness and the Due Process clause require an
insanity defense. Abolishing this narrowly defined
and deeply rooted defense could plausibly be justified
only if an alternative legal approach could reach the
same just result or if irremediably deep flaws preclude
fair and accurate administration of the defense.
The next two main sections of this brief argue that
there are no such alternatives and that the defense is
no more vulnerable to risks of mistake and abuse than
any other disputed issue in the penal law.
B. The Test for Legal Insanity
This brief takes no position about what test for the
affirmative defense of legal insanity any jurisdiction
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should adopt as long as the jurisdiction’s rule permits
defendants to raise defects resulting from severe
impairments caused by mental disorder or intellectual
disability that compromise the defendant’s understanding of the wrongfulness of his criminal actions despite
the presence of the mens rea required by the definition
of the offense. This is as it should be. As Justice
Marshall’s plurality opinion in Powell v. Texas said,
We cannot cast aside the centuries-long
evolution of the collection of interlocking and
overlapping concepts which the common law
has utilized to assess the moral accountability of an individual for his antisocial deeds.
The doctrines of actus reus, mens rea, insanity, mistake, justification, and duress have
historically provided the tools for a constantly
shifting adjustment of the tension between
the evolving aims of the criminal law
and changing religious, moral, philosophical,
and medical views of the nature of man. This
process of adjustment has always been
thought to be the province of the States.
Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 535-36 (1968) (emphasis
added).
Jurisdictions in our federal system have considerable constitutional leeway to decide what types of
disorders and their consequent impairments are
necessary to warrant a full legal excuse and what
procedures should govern insanity defense cases.
Indeed, in Clark, 548 U.S. 735, at 753-56, this Court
approved Arizona’s test for legal insanity, the nation’s
most limited rule.
Discussion in this brief has focused on lack of
the capacity to know, appreciate or understand the
wrongfulness of one’s actions or to regulate one’s
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behavior because, in one form or another, these
deficits best explain the predominant tests adopted by
forty-six states (including Arizona) and the federal
criminal code.3 But how such lack of understanding
or self-regulation should be defined doctrinally are
matters within the province of the states and the
federal government. Nevertheless, stigmatizing and
punishing all severely disordered offenders, even
those who were grossly out of touch with reality or
seriously unable to regulate their conduct at the time
of the crime is unjust. Such an offender is not a
responsible agent, is not at fault, and only some
defense of legal insanity can appropriately respond to
this moral truth that has been recognized in law for
centuries.
The Court should rule that the Due Process Clause
prohibits criminal conviction and punishment of an
offender who, as a result of mental disorder at the time
3

All states that recognize the insanity defense have a “test”
that is grounded in M’Naghten – (.i.e., that the defendant is not
criminally responsible if he was unable to “know” the nature
and quality of his conduct or unable to “know” that it was wrong).
Much of the case law relates to the meaning of “knowing” that the
act was “wrong.” The meaning of this phrase was a major
consideration in the drafting of the Model Penal Code insanity
test, which states that a person is not criminally responsible if he
lacked “substantial capacity” to “appreciate” the wrongfulness of
the conduct. The MPC drafters omitted the “nature and quality
of the act” part of M’Naghten because they regarded it as
superfluous. The term “appreciation” was used to embrace the
“affective” dimension of psychotic illness. It is designed to avoid
conviction of a delusional defendant who was so detached from
reality that he was unable to recognize the moral and emotional
significance of his act. See generally, Richard J. Bonnie, John C.
Jeffries, Jr., and Peter W. Low, A Case Study in the Insanity
Defense: The Trial of John W. Hinckley, Jr. 12-14, 18-20 (3rd. ed
2008).
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of the offense, did not know, appreciate or understand
the wrongfulness of his actions (or suffered from a
comparable cognitive defect that equally undermines
responsibility). Over the past century, many states
and legal commentators have embraced the view that
blame and punishment are also unfair in cases in
which the offender’s capacity to regulate his behavior
at the time of the offense was profoundly severely
impaired. Nevertheless, this view has never attracted
an equivalent level of legislative and judicial support,
and the court should, accordingly, leave the decision
whether to recognize a defense in such cases to the
individual states.
II. ADMITTING MENTAL DISORDER EVIDENCE TO NEGATE MENS REA OR
TO MITIGATE THE SENTENCE ARE
INADEQUATE SUBSTITUTES FOR THE
INSANITY DEFENSE
This section first addresses then “mens rea alternative” and then considers sentencing.
A. The Mens Rea Alternative
The negation of mens rea and the affirmative
defense of legal insanity are different claims that
preclude criminal liability by different means. The
former denies the prima facie case of the particular
crime charged; the latter is an affirmative defense
that precludes liability in those cases in which the
prima facie case is established. The post-verdict
consequences are also different. The former leads to
outright acquittal; the latter results in some form of
involuntary civil commitment. Although in some
cases the same mental disorder evidence may be used
to prove the two different claims, they are not
equivalent.
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The primary reason that permitting a defendant to
introduce evidence of mental disorder to negate mens
rea cannot justly replace the affirmative defense of
legal insanity is that the mens rea alternative is based
on a mistaken view of how severe mental disorder
affects human behavior. In virtually all cases, mental
disorder, even severe disorders marked by psychotic
symptoms such as delusions and hallucinations, does
not negate mens rea. Stephen J. Morse, Undiminished
Confusion in Diminished Capacity, 75 J. Crim. L. &
Criminology 1, 16 (1984); Morse, Mental, supra, at
933. It is difficult to prove a negative, but cases,
especially those involving serious crime, in which most
or all mens rea is negated are rare to the vanishing
point. Rather, mental disorder affects a person’s
motivations or reasons for committing the criminal
acts. A mentally disordered defendant’s irrationally
distorted beliefs, perceptions or desires typically and
paradoxically give him the motivation to form the
mens rea required by the charged offense. Mental
disorder rarely interferes with the ability to perform
the necessary actions to achieve irrationally motivated
aims. In cases of self-regulation problems, the defendant does form the mens rea but lacks substantial
capacity to conform his conduct to the law.
Consider the following, typical examples, beginning
with Daniel M’Naghten himself. M’Naghten’s Case, 8
Eng. Rep. 718 (1843); M’Naghten delusionally believed
that the ruling Tory party was persecuting and
intended to kill him. Richard Moran, Knowing
Right From Wrong: The Insanity Defense Of Daniel
McNaughtan 10 (2000). As a result, he formed the
belief that he needed to assassinate the Prime
Minister, Peel, in order to end the threat. He therefore
formed the intention to kill Peel. Thus, M’Naghten
would have been convicted of murder if a defense of
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legal insanity was not available. Indeed, his case has
come to stand for one of the “rules” enunciated by the
House of Lords – that a defendant should be acquitted
on grounds of insanity if he “was laboring under such
a defect of reason, from a disease of the mind, as not
to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing,
or if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing
what was wrong.” 8 Eng. Rep. at 722.
For a more contemporary example, consider the case
of Ms. Andrea Yates, the Texas woman who drowned
her five children in a bathtub. She delusionally
believed that she was corrupting her children and that
unless she killed them, they would be tortured in Hell
for all eternity. Deborah W. Denno, Who is Andrea
Yates? A Short Story About Insanity, 10 Duke J.
Gender L. & Pol’y 1 (2003). She therefore formed
the intention to kill them. Indeed, she planned
the homicides carefully. Ms. Yates was nonetheless
acquitted by reason of insanity because she did not
know that what she was doing was wrong. Even if she
cognitively recognized that her conduct violated the
law of Texas and that she would be arrested, she was
deeply convinced that the homicides were necessary to
assure the eternal well-being of her children under the
circumstances. In her psychotic thinking, everyone
else would approve of her conduct as justified if they
knew what she knew.
For a final example, suppose an offender hallucinates that he is hearing God’s voice or delusionally
believes that God is communicating with him and that
God is commanding him to kill. E.g., People v. Serravo,
823 P. 2d 828, 830 (Colo. 1992) (en banc). If the
offender kills in response to this “command hallucination” or delusion, he surely forms the intent to kill to
obey the divine decree. Nonetheless, it would be
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unjust to punish this defendant because he, too, does
not know right from wrong given his beliefs for which
he is not responsible.
In all three cases, one could also claim that the
defendant did not know what he or she was doing in a
fundamental sense because the most material reason
for action, what motivated them to form mens rea, was
based on a delusion or hallucination that was the
irrational product of a disordered mind. Finally, in all
three cases the defendant’s instrumental rationality,
the ability rationally to achieve one’s ends, was
intact despite their severe disorders. They were able
effectively to carry out their disordered plans.
There are very few contemporary data about the
operation of the insanity defense and virtually none
about the operation of the mens rea alternative.
Montana is the only state for which there is a
systematic study of mental disorder claims pre- and
post-abolition of the insanity defense. The picture is
complicated, but in brief, the number of cases, the
types of defendants and the types of crimes did not
change. There were two major effects, however.
Under the mens rea alternative, more defendants
were convicted and the number of defendants found
incompetent to stand trial increased markedly. Lisa
Callahan et al., The Hidden Effects of Montana’s
“Abolition” of the Insanity Defense, 66 Psychiatric Q.
103 (1995). Neither change is desirable. For the
reasons given in Part I, supra, conviction is unjust in
any case in which the defendant should have been
acquitted by reason of insanity. The increase in
convictions in Montana demonstrates that abolition of
the insanity defense does, in fact, expose severely
mentally ill offenders to unjust punishment. Moreover, the rise in the number of defendants found
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incompetent to stand trial who would previously have
been found competent and acquitted suggests that an
incompetency finding is being used as a tool for
diversion in cases involving less serious charges
that likely would have led to stipulated insanity
acquittals under the pre-abolition statute. This is also
objectionable.
Although Kahler seemed to have had the mens rea
required for the charged offense of capital murder, his
expert evidence established that he suffered from a
number of mental disorders, including a major mental
disorder, severe depression. As a result, the expert
opined, Kahler’s perception and judgment were so
distorted that he may have become dissociated from
reality at the time of the crime. The expert also
testified that Kahler could not refrain from his
conduct. Because an insanity defense was not available and Kahler’s conduct met the criteria for capital
murder, his conviction for the most serious crime
in the criminal law was improperly a foregone
conclusion.
To further understand the injustice of the mens rea
alternative, consider a case in which mens rea may
plausibly be negated. Suppose a defendant charged
with murder claims that he delusionally believed that
his obviously human victim of a shooting was in reality
the devil and not a human being. See Richard J.
Bonnie, The Moral Basis of the Insanity Defense,
69 A.B.A. J. 194, 195-96 (1983). If his beliefs were
genuine, the defendant did not intentionally kill a
human being. Indeed, in a mens rea alternative
jurisdiction, he could not be convicted of purposely,
knowingly or recklessly killing a human being because
his delusional beliefs negated all three mental states.
After all, he fully believed that he was shooting at the
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devil, not a human being. The defendant would be
convicted of negligent homicide, however, because the
standard for negligence is objective reasonableness
and the motivating belief was patently unreasonable.
Of course, convicting the severely disordered
defendant of a crime based on a negligence standard is
fundamentally unjust, as even Mr. Justice Holmes
recognized in his rightly famous essays on the common
law. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Common Law
50-51 (Little, Brown & Co. 1945) (1881). The defendant’s unreasonable mistake was not an ordinary
mistake caused by inattention, carelessness or the
like. Defendants are responsible for the latter because
we believe that they had the capacity to behave more
reasonably by being more careful or attentive. In
contrast, the hypothetical defendant’s delusional
“mistake” was the product of a disordered mind and
thus he had no insight and no ability to recognize the
gross distortion of reality. He was a victim of his
disorder, not someone who deserves blame and punishment as a careless perpetrator of involuntary
manslaughter. He does not deserve any blame and
punishment, and only the defense of legal insanity
could achieve this appropriate result. Paradoxically,
such a defendant’s potential future dangerousness if
he remains deluded would be better addressed by an
insanity acquittal and indefinite involuntary commitment, a practice this Court has approved, Jones v.
U.S., 463 U.S. 354 (1983), than by the comparatively
short, determinate sentences for involuntary manslaughter.
Thus, the mens rea alternative is not an acceptable
replacement or substitute for the insanity defense.
Only in the exceedingly rare case in which mental
disorder negates all mens rea would the equivalent
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justice of a full acquittal be achieved, albeit for a
different reason. But again, this is the rarest of cases.
Most legally insane offenders form the mens rea
required by the definition of the charged offense and
only the defense of legal insanity can respond justly to
their lack of blameworthiness.
B. Sentencing
Consideration of mental disorder for purposes of
assessing both mitigation and aggravation is a staple
of both capital and non-capital sentencing, but it is no
substitute for the affirmative defense of legal insanity.
On moral grounds, it is unfair to blame and punish a
defendant who deserves no blame and punishment at
all, even if the offender’s sentence is reduced. Blaming
and punishing in such cases is unjust, full stop.
Sentencing judges might also use mental disorder as
an aggravating consideration because it might suggest
that the defendant is especially dangerous as a result.
Thus, sentences of severely mentally ill offenders
might be enhanced. Again, injustice would result, and
indeterminate post-acquittal comment would better
protect public safety than enhanced sentences. Third,
unless a sentencing judge is required by law to
consider mental disorder at sentencing, whether the
judge does so will be entirely discretionary. Again,
this is a potent, potential source of injustice. In short,
only a required insanity defense would insure that
arguably blameless mentally disordered offenders
have an opportunity to establish that state blame and
punishment are not justified.
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III. THE OBJECTIONS TO THE INSANITY
DEFENSE ARE TOO INSUBSTANTIAL
TO JUSTIFY ABOLITION
A number of objections to the insanity defense have
been raised by proponents of abolition, including
Kansas, but they are insubstantial and provide not
even a rational basis for abolishing a defense with
such a profound historical, legal, and moral basis. See
Marc Rosen, Insanity Denied: Abolition of the Insanity
Defense in Kansas, 8 Kan. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 253, 25560 (1998). They certainly cannot survive a more
demanding standard of review. In general, these
objections relate to supposed difficulties of administering the insanity defense fairly and accurately. Specific
objections include: (A) administering the defense
requires an assessment of the defendant’s past mental
state using controversial psychiatric and psychological
evidence, a task that is too difficult; (B) acquitting
insane defendants endangers public safety; (C) the
indeterminacy of the defense produces arbitrary
verdicts; and (D) it invites fraudulent claims by
defendants trying to “beat the rap.”
A. Assessing Past Mental State Using
Psychological
and
Psychiatric
Evidence
It is often difficult to reconstruct past mental states
and, as this Court has acknowledged, psychological
and psychiatric evidence can be problematic. Clark,
548 U.S. at 740-41; Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 413
(2002). Nevertheless, all jurisdictions, including mens
rea alternative jurisdictions, concede the necessity of
proving mens rea (for most crimes) before punishment
may justly be imposed. Consequently, the argument
against the insanity defense based on the difficulty of
reconstructing past mental states must fail unless
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assessing past intent, knowledge, and other types
of mens rea is easier than assessing whether the
defendant was acting under the influence of severely
abnormal mental states. After all, both mens rea and
legal insanity refer to past mental states that must
be inferred from the defendant’s actions, including
utterances. The severe disorder that is practically
necessary to support an insanity defense is arguably
easier to prove than ordinary mens rea.
Despite the problems with mental health evidence,
all but four jurisdictions that have abolished the
insanity defense believe that assessing legal insanity
at the time of the crime with mental health evidence
is possible. Indeed, it is routine. Moreover, even the
four abolitionist jurisdictions permit introduction of
such evidence to negate mens rea. Unless abolitionist
jurisdictions are prepared to argue—and none has—
that assessing mens rea with mental health evidence
is uniquely reliable, the argument based on the
deficiencies of mental health evidence lacks credibility. Finally, mental health evidence is routinely
admitted in a vast array of civil and criminal contexts,
including all the criminal competencies and
sentencing.
B. Public Safety
As previously argued, the insanity defense poses no
danger to public safety. Successful insanity defenses
are so rare that deterrence will not be undermined
because few legally sane defendants will believe that
they can avoid conviction by manipulatively and
falsely raising the defense. More important, every
jurisdiction provides for commitment to a secure
mental facility after a defendant has been acquitted by
reason of insanity and this Court has approved
the constitutionality of indefinite confinement (with
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periodic review) of such acquittees as long as they
remain mentally disordered and dangerous. Jones,
463 U.S. 354; Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1992);
Morse, Mental, supra, at 932. Further, this Court has
approved procedures for the commitments that are
more likely to result in continued confinement of
acquittees than standard civil commitment. Jones,
463 U.S. 354. It is of course true that acquittees might
be released earlier than if they had been convicted and
imprisoned, but there is no evidence that released
acquittees pose a special danger to the community.
Michael K. Spodak et al., Criminality of Discharged
Insanity Acquittees: Fifteen Year Experience in
Maryland Reviewed, 12 Bull. Am. Acad. Psychiatry L.
373, 382 (1984); Mark R. Wiederanders et al., Forensic
Conditional Release Programs and Outcomes in Three
States, 20 Int’l J.L. & Psychiatry 249, 249-257 (1997);
Lisa A. Callahan et al., Revocation of Conditional
Release: A Comparison of Individual and Program
Characteristics across Four States, 21 Int’l J.L. &
Psychiatry 177 (1998); George F. Parker, Outcomes of
Assertive Community Treatment in an NGRI Conditional Release Program, 32 J. Am. Acad. Psychiatry &
L. 291, 291-303 (2004); Henry J. Steadman et al.,
Factors Associated With a Successful Insanity Plea,
140 Am.J. Psychiatry 401, 402-03 (1983).
C. Indeterminacy of the Insanity Tests
Unlike many other criteria for criminal liability, the
insanity defense tests do not raise strictly factual
questions. Rather, the judgment made about the
defendant’s mental state at the time of the crime is
primarily a legal, moral, and social judgment. For
example, whether the defendant fired the fatal bullet
and intended to kill the victim, thus satisfying
the elements of murder, are factual questions with
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determinate, albeit often difficult to determine,
answers. By contrast, the insanity defense tests ask
indeterminate questions, such as how much understanding of right and wrong a defendant must have in
order to be acquitted (or, in the minority of states that
also have a control test, how substantially their
capacity to control their conduct was impaired). Of
course, the legal judgment must be based on facts, but
the legal test is normative and not factual. The
insanity defense tests prescribe the relevant behavioral continuum, but drawing the line between guilt
and innocence is the task of the finder of fact as the
legal and moral representative of the community.
Except at the extremes, there are rarely determinate
answers to such questions. Although decisions about
normative criteria can be difficult, decisions about
legal insanity are no more challenging (and probably
more determinate) than judgments about reasonableness or recklessness that finders of fact routinely
make.
D. Fraudulent Claims
Few defendants who are actually legally sane in
some objective sense “beat the rap” with the insanity
defense. Experts using the proper diagnostic tools can
reliably distinguish people who are faking major
mental disorder. Michael L. Perlin, “The Borderline
Which Separated You from Me”: The Insanity Defense,
the Authoritarian Spirit, the Fear of Faking, and the
Culture of Punishment, 82 Iowa L. Rev. 1375, 1409-16
(1997) Further, it is best estimated that the insanity
defense is raised in less than one percent of federal and
state trials and is rarely successful. Nat’l Mental
Health Ass’n, Myths and Realities: A Report of the
Nat’l Comm’n on the Insanity Defense 14-15 (1983);
Richard A. Pasewark, Insanity Pleas: A Review of the
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Research Literature, 9 J. Psychiatry & Law 357, 36166 (1981).
The complaint that the availability of the defense of
legal insanity allows large numbers of guilty criminals
to avoid conviction and punishment is simply
unfounded. Prosecutors and defense attorneys alike
generally recognize that insanity is a defense of last
resort that betokens an otherwise weak defense and
that rarely succeeds. Insanity acquittals are far too
infrequent to communicate the message that the
criminal justice system is “soft” or fails to protect
society. It is impossible to measure precisely the
symbolic value of these acquittals, but it is also hard
to believe that they have much impact on social or
individual perceptions. So few insanity pleas succeed
that neither aspiring criminals nor society assume
that conviction and punishment will be averted by
raising the defense.
And, of course, if the defendant is legally insane and
succeeds with the defense, he deserves to be acquitted
and has not “beaten the rap” at all.
The “tough on crime” justification that underlies
this argument is based on a fundamental misconception about the meaning of an insanity acquittal. In
cases of a successful insanity defense, the prima facie
case for guilt has been established and the verdict thus
announces that the defendant’s conduct was wrong.
Nonetheless, the defendant did not deserve blame and
punishment and will be confined by commitment.
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CONCLUSION
Until the latter part of the Twentieth Century, all
American jurisdictions had some version of the
insanity defense. Even now, only four states have
abolished the defense. The historical practice and
continuing consensus favoring retention of the defense
reflect a longstanding legal and moral judgment that
it is unfair and unjust to blame and punish criminal
defendants who lacked the capacity to understand
or appreciate the wrongness of their actions. This
proposition is so rooted in our legal and moral traditions and culture that this Court should recognize its
constitutional status. Further, there is no alternative
that will achieve equal justice by other means.
Finally, the policy reasons that might override the
fairness concerns are insufficient. Accordingly, we
urge the Court to rule that the insanity defense is so
deeply rooted in our nation’s legal traditions and is so
fundamental to justice that it may not be abolished.
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at UC Hastings. She teaches criminal justice and civil
rights.
Barbara Babcock, a former defense attorney, is Crown
Prof. Emerita, Stanford Law School, where she taught
criminal justice.
Cheryl G. Bader is Associate Clinical Professor of Law
Fordham University. A former AUSA, she is currently
teaching an interdisciplinary Criminal Defense Clinic
that collaborates with Ph.D. candidates in Fordham’s
Forensic Psychology program.
W. David Ball is Associate Professor at the Santa
Clara School of Law and Co-Chair of the Corrections
Committee of the American Bar Association.
Brook K. Baker is Professor of Law at Northeastern
University School of Law. He teaches disability rights.
Susan A. Bandes is Centennial Professor of Law
Emeritus at DePaul University College of Law. She
has written extensively in the fields of criminal law,
criminal procedure, and law and psychology.
Rachel E. Barkow is the Vice Dean and Segal Family
Professor of Regulatory Law and Policy and the
Faculty Director of the Center on the Administration
of Criminal Law at NYU School of Law.
Loftus Becker is Professor of Law Emeritus at the
University of Connecticut School of Law. He taught
and wrote about criminal law, constitutional law, and
law and psychology and psychiatry from 1972 to 2018.

3a
Valena Beety is Professor of Law at the Sandra Day
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wrongful convictions.
Adam Benforado is Professor of Law at the Drexel
University Kline School of Law. He teaches criminal
law and law and mind sciences, and his research is
focused on law and psychology.
Michael J. Benza is Senior Instructor of Law at Case
Western Reserve University, School of Law. He
teaches criminal law and constitutional criminal
procedure with special focus on the death penalty and
prisoners’ rights, and has represented death row
inmates for over 20 years.
Vera Bergelson is Professor of Law and Robert E.
Knowlton Scholar at Rutgers School of Law-Newark.
She writes extensively about criminal law.
Mitchell Berman is the Leon Meltzer Professor of Law,
and Professor of Philosophy, at the University of
Pennsylvania. He teaches and writes in criminal law
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the University of Mississippi School of Law. He
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Donald N. Bersoff is Professor of Law Emeritus at
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Buffalo School of Law, SUNY. He is author of The
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Louisiana State University and at the University of
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Trial Techniques at Cornell Law School where he
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and Public Policy at the University of Virginia. He is
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Law School, Albany, NY. He teaches criminal procedure
and constitutional law and has written and lectured
extensively about criminal law and constitutional law
subjects.
Deborah L. Borman, who is also a social worker, is
Assistant Professor of Law at the University of
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Law and Social Justice at Loyola University of Chicago
School of Law. He is the Director of Loyola’s Civitas
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criminal procedure and has written extensively on
prosecutorial decision-making.
Frank A. Bress is Professor of Law, Director of Clinical
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Experiential Learning at New York Law School. He
has taught a criminal defense clinic and related
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cases.
Katherine S. Broderick is Dean Emerita and Joseph
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6a
She is former director of the criminal defense clinic for
10 years, member of the Access to Justice Commission.
William M. Brooks is Clinical Professor of Law at
Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center. He
teaches mental health law and has both litigated on
behalf of and written extensively about the rights of
people with mental illness.
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Rosanna Cavallaro is Professor of Law at Suffolk
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Carol A. Chase is Professor Emerita at Pepperdine
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federal prosecutor.
Kami Chavis is Professor Law and Director of the
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criminal law.
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Martin Luther King Jr. Professor of Law at the
University of California, Davis School of Law. He
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Jefferson School of Law, where she taught criminal
law, criminal procedure and evidence.
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criminal law, evidence, and trial advocacy.
Kevin Cole is Professor of Law at the University of San
Diego, where he teaches criminal law and procedure.
He is the editor of the CrimProf Blog and has written
on the topic of criminal responsibility and practical
limits in litigating about it.
Beth A. Colgan is an Assistant Professor of Law at
UCLA School of Law, where she teaches criminal law.
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John Copacino is Professor of Law at Georgetown
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Willamette University, College of Law. She teaches
criminal law, criminal procedure, and international
criminal law and has written extensively about
criminal law and human rights norms relating to
criminal defendants.
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Criminal Procedure at the Elisabeth Haub School of
Law at Pace University. He has been supervising
attorney of the Pace Criminal Justice Clinic for the
last seven years.

12a
Joshua Dressler is Distinguished University Professor
Emeritus at Ohio State University and the Frank R.
Strong Chair in Law Emeritus at the Moritz College of
Law at Ohio State University. He is the author of
leading casebooks and treatises in criminal law and
procedure.
Steven Duke is a Professor of Law at Yale Law School,
where he teaches criminal procedure.
Martha-Grace Duncan is Professor of Law at Emory
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